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Citizens For Strong Schools, Inc., Et Al. V.
Florida State Board Of Education, Et Al.:
How The Florida Supreme Court Decision
Will Have Distressing Effects On Public
Education For Vulnerable Children
Kristen Calzadilla*
Free public-school education is fundamental aspect to many
citizens life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness in the United States.
As states add constitutional provisions guaranteeing a public
education, there are still great disproportionalities in the
adequacy pf education provided to underrepresented students.
Such are the issues at the heart of the recent Florida Supreme
Court case, Citizens for Strong Schools, Inc., et al. v. Florida State
Board of Education, et al. Citizens for Strong Schools throws its
hat into the contentious debate over equitable educational
standards. However, despite other state supreme courts’ rulings
that similar provisions in the state constitutions are justiciable,
thereby giving the injured parties a way to force legislative
change, the Florida Supreme Court refused to get involved,
declaring the provision a nonjusticiable political issue that does
not allow for judicial intervention to remedy the inequitable
policies.

*
I am very grateful for the opportunity to have researched and published an article on
a topic that means so much to me. I would especially like to thank Bernie Perlmutter, who
has been the best mentor I could ever ask for and without whom this article would not exist;
my parents, who have supported me throughout my entire life and especially in law school;
and Raymond, who encouraged me to attend law school and who pushes me to be the best
version of myself so that I can contribute better to the world. I am immensely thankful for
all of you.

24

2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

25

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 26
II. THE 1998 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND ITS
RELEVANT CASELAW ................................................................ 28
III. BACKSTORY AND EXPLANATION OF CITIZENS FOR
STRONG SCHOOLS ........................................................................ 35
i. Procedural History prior to Florida Supreme Court ruling ...... 35
ii. Florida Supreme Court ruling ................................................... 40
IV. ANALYSIS ..................................................................................... 44
i. THE PLURALITY IN CITIZENS FOR STRONGER
SCHOOLS ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED
PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATION AS A NONJUSTICIABLE
POLITICAL QUESTION ........................................................... 44
ii. THE LACK OF UNIFORMITY AND ADEQUATE
PROVISIONS WILL HAVE DEVASTATING EFFECTS ON
FLORIDA’S CHILDREN—ESPECIALLY ITS MOST
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS ............................................... 48
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 52

26

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 12:1

INTRODUCTION

Free public-school education is a fundamental piece of the fabric of
the United States—a symbol of our historic faith in upward mobility in a
democracy. It is so important, in fact, that many states, including Florida,
have put provisions regarding educational guarantees into the state’s
constitution1. Florida’s Constitution, for example, has the following
educational mandate:
The education of children is a fundamental value2 of the
people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount
duty of the state3 to make adequate provision for the
1

See Ala. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; Alaska CONST. art. VII, § 1; Ariz. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1; Ark. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; Cal. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Colo. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Conn.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-2; Del. CONST. art. X, § 1; Ga. CONST. wart. VIII, § 1; Haw. CONST.
art. X, § 1; Idaho CONST. art. IX, § 1; Ill. CONST. art. X, § 1; Ind. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
Iowa CONST. art. IX, § 1; Kan. CONST. art. VI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; La. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; Me. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; Md. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Mass. CONST. art. V, § 2;
Mich. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; Minn. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo.
CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); Mont. CONST. art. X, § 1; Neb. CONST. art. VII, § 1; Nev. CONST.
art. XI, § 1; N.H. CONST.pt. Second, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, §4, para. 2; N.M. CONST.
art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; id. art. IX, §§ 1-2; N.D.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 4; Ohio CONST. art. VI, § 2; Okla. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Or. CONST.
art. VIII, §§ 3, 8; Pa. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI,
§ 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Tenn. CONST. art. XI, § 12; Tex. CONST. art. VII, § 1; Utah
CONST. art. X, § 1; Vt. CONST. § 68; Va. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Wash. CONST. art. IX, § 1;
W. Va. CONST. art. XII, § 1; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 23.
2
Florida’s citizens have believed in the essential nature of education since its inception:
“[E]ducation is absolutely essential to a free society under our government structure.” Bush
v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 405 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in
Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 409 (Fla. 1996) (Overton, J. concurring)).
The term “fundamental value” is adopted from the language used by the dissent in
Coalition: “Surely all would agree that education is a fundamental value in our
society . . . .The people of Florida recognized the fundamental value of education by
making express provision for education in our constitution.” Jon Mills & Timothy
McLendon, Strengthening the Duty to Provide Public Education, 72 NO.9 FLA. BAR J. 28
(1998) (quoting Coal., 680 So. 2d at 410 (Anstead, J., dissenting)).
3
Indeed, the Supreme Court noted public education as a paramount duty of the state in
cases such as Brown v. Board of Education: “education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local government. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society . . . [S]uch an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982): “The American
people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of
supreme importance . . . In addition, education provides the basic tools by which
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education of all children residing within its borders.
Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform,
efficient, safe, secure, and high-quality system of free
public schools that allows students to obtain a highquality education . . . .4
Public school education, though, must be adequate and equitable for
all students, and states must take responsibility when its school system is
not living up to the standards that America’s children deserve.5 If a state’s
policies are disproportionately, negatively affecting vulnerable children’s
lives—such as minority children, children born into lower socioeconomic
classes, and children with disabilities—then those affected must have an
ability to challenge the policies as injured parties, especially if those
policies are rooted in the state constitution. A claim based on the state’s
constitutional issues are typical examples of the kinds of claims that are
commonly dealt with in the judiciary.6 But what happens when a state
Supreme Court refuses to rule on constitutional issues?
individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum,
education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society.” (quotations
omitted).
4
Fla. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (emphasis added).
5
Indeed, the educational mandates in other states’ constitutions have been found to be
justiciable in a variety of situations: See Citizens for Stronger Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd.
of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127, 149, n. 16 (Fla. 2021) (Pariente, J., Dissenting) (See, e.g., Lobato
v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1137 (Colo. 2013) (“Plaintiffs presented a justiciable claim
because ‘determin[ing] whether the state’s public school financing system is rationally
related to the constitutional mandate that the General Assembly provide a “thorough and
uniform” system of public education’ does not ‘unduly infring[e] on the legislature’s
policymaking authority.’” (quoting Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 363 (Colo. 2008));
Conn. Coal. for Just. in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 242 (2010) (“[T]his
court has a role in ensuring that our state’s public school students receive th[e] fundamental
guarantee” provided in the state constitution.); Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989); Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2018)
(“Although specific determinations of educational policy are matters for the Legislature, it
does not follow that the judiciary cannot adjudicate whether the Legislature has satisfied
its constitutional duty under the Education Clause.”); Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist.
No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 261 (2005) (“As the final guardian and protector of the right
to education, it is incumbent upon the court to assure that the system enacted by the
Legislature enforces, protects and fulfills the right. We conclude this issue is justiciable.”);
Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249, 253 (1997) (“It has long been understood
that it is the duty of the courts to determine the meaning of the requirements of our
Constitution.”); McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227, 231 (2012) (“The
judiciary has the primary responsibility for interpreting [the constitution] to give it meaning
and legal effect.”); see also, e.g., Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 599
S.E.2d 365 (2004)).
6
See generally In re Sen. Jt. Res. of Legis. Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 686
(Fla. 2012) (issuing declaratory judgment that senate apportionment plan was
unconstitutional); Askew v. Schuster, 331 So.2d 297, 300 (Fla. 1976) (The Court “will not
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Such are the issues at the heart of the recent Florida Supreme Court
case, Citizens for Strong Schools, Inc., et al. v. Florida State Board of
Education, et al.7 Citizens for Strong Schools throws its hat into the
contentious debate over equitable educational standards. However, despite
other state supreme courts’ rulings that similar provisions in the state
constitutions are justiciable, thereby giving the injured parties a way to
force legislative change,8 the Florida Supreme Court refused to get
involved, declaring the provision a nonjusticiable political issue that does
not allow for judicial intervention to remedy the inequitable policies.
This case note contains five parts, including its introduction. Part II
describes the relevant constitutional history of education in Florida and
analyzes both the duty that the relevant educational amendment from
19989 created for the State of Florida, as well as the legislation and policies
that stemmed from the constitutional amendment. Part III explains the case
law that led to and followed the relevant constitutional amendment. Part
IV describes Citizens for Strong Schools’ backstory and analyzes how the
court’s ruling stands as a break from the trends in other state supreme
courts to utilize state constitutional protections for school equity and the
troubling implications of the ruling in the instant case. Part V is the
Conclusion.

II.

THE 1998 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND ITS
RELEVANT CASELAW

Florida became a state of the union in 1845, seven years after the thenterritory drafted a constitution.10 The Constitution was amended in 1868
to include the language that it was “the paramount duty of the State to
make ample provision for the education of all the children.”11 In 1885, the
seek to substitute its judgment for that of another coordinate branch of government, but
will only measure acts done with the yardstick of the constitution”) (citations omitted);
Dade Cnty. Classroom Tchrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1972)
(“The judiciary is in a lofty sense the guardian of the law of the land and the Constitution
is the high law. A constitution would be a meaningless instrument without some
responsible agency of government having authority to enforce it.”).
7
Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. Of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. of App. 2019).
8
See id. at 149, n.16 (Pariente, J., Dissenting).
9
Fla. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (1998).
10
Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc., 262 So. 3d at 127 (citing Coal. for Adequacy &
Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 405 (Fla. 1996)).
11
Fla. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1868); see also 2 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, at 716 (Government Printing Office, 1909).
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phrase “paramount duty” was deleted from the Constitutional amendment,
and the strength of the State’s duty was reduced substantially.12 Prior to
1998, article IX § 1(a) stated that “[a]dequate provision shall be made by
law for a uniform system of free public schools.”13
The seminal interpretation of the pre-1998 amendment came in 1996
with the Florida Supreme Court case, Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness
in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles.14 In Coalition, Appellants—which
consisted of 11 Florida public school students and their parents and
guardians, 23 citizens and taxpayers of the State of Florida who are also
members of various school boards in the state, and 45 school boards from
varying counties in Florida15—sought declaratory relief and requested the
trial court declare an adequate education a fundamental right under the
Constitution.16 Appellants alleged that the State had “failed to provide its
students that fundamental right by failing to allocate adequate resources
for a uniform system of free public school as provided for in the Florida
Constitution.”17 Appellants further alleged the following:
(1) Certain students are not receiving adequate programs
to permit them to gain proficiency in the English
language; (2) Economically deprived students are not
receiving adequate education for their greater educational
needs; (3) Gifted, disabled, and mentally handicapped
children are not receiving adequate special programs; (4)
Students in property-poor counties are not receiving an
adequate education; (5) Education capital outlay needs
are not adequately provided for; and (6) School districts
are unable to perform their constitutional duties because
of the legislative imposition of noneducational and quasieducational burdens.18

A “paramount duty” imposes a Category IV duty upon the legislature, the highest duty
possible to impose on a legislature. Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc.,
680 So. 2d at 405. By dropping such language, the 1885 Constitutional amendment reduces
the strength of the duty on the legislature. See also Mills and McLendon, supra note 2
(discussing previous Florida constitutional educational mandate in the 1868 constitution
and how the 1885 constitutional amendment reduced the duty imposed on the state to
provide for public education.); see also Barbara J. Staros, School Finance Reform
Litigation in Florida: A Historical Analysis, 23 STETSON L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1994).
13
See Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. Of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127, 129
(Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (citing Fla. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (1968)) (emphasis added).
14
Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc., 680 So. 2d at 400.
15
Id. at 402, n.1.
16
Id. at 402.
17
Id.
18
Id.
12
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Appellees argued that Appellants raised a non-justiciable political
question and that due to the separation of powers doctrine, the nonjusticiable political question is outside of the scope of the judiciary’s
jurisdiction.19 They further argued that “the constitution has committed the
determination of ‘adequacy’ to the legislature, and that there is a ‘lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards; to apply to the question
of ‘adequacy.’”20
The Court agreed with the Appellee’s arguments, holding that
Appellants “failed to demonstrate in their allegations, or in their arguments
on appeal, an appropriate standard for determining ‘adequacy’ of support
provided by state that would not present a substantial risk of judicial
intrusion into the powers and responsibilities assigned to the legislature,
in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.”21 The Court affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint, which “asked the trial court to declare that
an adequate education is a fundamental right . . . and that the State has
failed to provide its students that fundamental right by failing to allocate
adequate resources for a uniform system of free public schools.”22 In
rejecting this claim, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned the Appellants
“made a blanket assertion that the entire system is constitutionally
inadequate”23 which would require judicial intrusion into the Legislative
branch’s appropriations power. The Court agreed with the trial court’s
order, which stated that “there is no textually demonstrable guidance in
Article IX, section 1, by which the courts may decide, [a priori], whether
given an over level of state funds is ‘adequate’ in the abstract.”24 The Court
further agreed with the trial court’s ruling on the constitutionality of the
state legislature’s appropriations for education would violate the
separation of powers doctrine of the Florida Constitution: “To decide such
an abstract question of ‘adequate’ funding, the courts would necessarily
be required to subjectively evaluate the Legislature’s value judgments as
to the spending priorities to be assigned to the state’s many needs,
education being one of them.”25
Justice Ben Overton concurred with the holding but disagreed with
certain aspects of the majority’s reasoning; namely, he stressed his belief
that the judiciary can enforce Article IX, § 1 in certain specific cases.
Justice Overton additionally emphasized that the outcome of the case
“does not preclude the treatment of education as an essential, fundamental
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Id. at 408.
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id. at 407-08.
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right”26 and “suggested that the term ‘adequate’ might have some
‘minimum threshold . . . below which the funding provided by the
legislature would be considered ‘inadequate.’”27 He suggested that
evidence of “a thirty percent illiteracy rate” would be an example of a
cause of action that would potentially necessitate the judiciary to
intervene.28
Following the decision in Coalition, the Florida Constitution Revision
Commission (“CRC”) proposed amendments to Article IX section 1
during its 1997-1998 legislative sessions.29 The CRC met during the 19971998 legislative sessions in Florida to propose various amendments,
including an amendment similar to the language of the educational
provision; this amendment to the educational provision came as a response
to Coalition and the Florida Supreme Court ruling that the then-current
version of the constitutional provision did not provide for judicially
manageable standards.30 This constitutional amendment, proposed by
eight members and one alternate member of the CRC, was introduced
various times throughout 1997-1998. CRC amended and redrafted and was
officially adopted as Proposals 157 and 181.
Proposal 157 drew various concerns at the CRC’s February 26, 1998,
meeting over the ability of injured parties to bring lawsuits against the state
based on the amendment’s definition of “adequate provision.”31 The
Commissioner of the Style and Drafting Committee (which amended
Proposal 157 before it reached the floor on its final vote on February 26,
1998), Jon Lester Mills, acknowledged that although the proposed
constitutional amendment was aspirational in explaining the state’s goals
for public education, because of defining “adequate provision,” it likely
would open the state up to litigation.32 Commissioner Mills also
acknowledged that if the system was somehow inadequate based on the
constitutional definition and that if interested parties (such as parents)
brought suit with evidence as to how any individual school was
26

Id. at 409.
Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. Of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127, 138 (Fla.
1st DCA 2019).
28
Id.
29
As a result of a 1968 amendment to the Florida Constitution, the CRC must meet
every two decades to propose amendments to the Florida Constitution. Fla. CONST. art. XI,
§ 2 (1968). In order for one of the proposed CRC constitutional amendments to pass, there
must be a statewide ballot vote and the voters must approve the amendment by sixty
percent.
30
See Citizens for Strong Schs., 262 So. 3d at 145 (Pariente, J., dissenting); see also
discussion infra Part III.
31
Fla. Const. Revision Comm’n, Meeting Proceedings for Feb. 26, 1998, at 37-60
(1998).
32
See supra note 8, at 53-54.
27
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inadequate, it would possibly be representative of the system as a whole.33
As Commissioner Mills stated:
This doesn’t create an individual cause of action because
it deals with the system. In other words, this creates an
obligation and a definition that we hope the Legislature
adheres to. It wouldn’t allow you to sue your school
system, as an individual. You could sue the entire state if
you could prove that it was not uniform and inadequate.
And, in fact, there have been lawsuits in the past on
uniformity in both this state and other states. But you
would be suing on the system as it applies to you . . . .It
would strengthen the position vis-à-vis the system. In
other words, the issue is, at least as I understand it, if one
individual has a bad result, that’s not enough to create an
action. But if the system is inadequate or un-uniform, and
that can be shown, then it is possible for a system to be
declared unconstitutional.34
Additionally, the Commissioner acknowledged that the advantage of
including the definition of “adequate provision” in the proposed
amendment for the Constitution would give guidance to the Florida
Supreme Court in regard to possible lawsuits on the adequacy of the public
school system.35 This language “was intended to define what adequate
education should be in the state of Florida with common terms used in
other constitutions.”36 This would thereby create a justiciable standard that
the Florida Supreme Court could look at in any possible constitutional
litigation.37
Further evidence from the CRC shows that the intent of the
constitutional amendment was to create a definition by which the judiciary
33

Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 52-53.
35
Id. at 57-58.
36
See Mills and McLendon, supra note 2, at n.69.
37
“Commissioner Mills spoke of the importance of providing a definition for adequacy
‘which would give guidance to either the legislature or the courts,’ noting: ‘I think the
terms used here are understandable, they are derived . . . from other states that have a higher
standard, and they give the court and any future legislature an opportunity to meet a
standard of adequacy.” Id. at n.70. “[T]he new standard is intended to provide a benchmark
to require government to act when the system can be demonstrated to be dangerous,
unhealthy, or not of high quality. The standard allows courts to make a determination of
unconstitutionality. However, the new standard is also intended to place the legislature on
notice that the people of Florida expect more with regard to education.” Id. at n.72 (citing
Fla. Const. Revision Comm’n, Meeting Proceedings for Jan. 13, 1998, at 203 (1998)
(Statement of Comm’r Brochin)).
34
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could interpret the educational system’s effectiveness in Florida. In an
Amicus Curiae brief to the Florida Supreme Court in the later Citizens for
Stronger Schools appeal,38 several members of the 1998 CRC wrote in
favor of Petitioners’ arguments. These CRC members contended that the
history of the CRC and the ratified Article IX § 1(a) proves that the
purpose of the amendment was “to provide a judicially-enforceable right
to a public school system that is ‘uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high
quality.’”39 According to William A. Buzzett and Deborah K. Kearney’s
Commentary, “The addition of ‘efficient, safe, secure, and high quality’
represents an attempt by the 1997-1998 Constitution Revision
Commission to provide constitutional standards to measure the
“adequacy” provision found in the second sentence of section 1.”40 The
resulting amendment, following the adoption of Proposal 157 and which
was approved by Florida voters in 1998,41 states as follows:
The education of children is a fundamental value of the
people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount
duty of the state to make adequate provision for the
education of all children residing within its borders.
Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform,
efficient, safe, secure, and high-quality system of free
public schools that allows students to obtain a highquality education.42
Scholars who have analyzed state education articles or clauses “have
classified them into four categories based upon the level of duty imposed

38

Amicus Curiae Brief of Certain Commissioners of 1998 Constitution Revision
Commission in Support of Appellants, Citizens for Stronger Schs., Inc., v. Fla. State Bd. of
Educ., 262 So. 3d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (No. SC18-67) 2018 WL 3328836.
39
Id. at 1-2.
40
See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 404 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Fla. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1, construed in William A. Buzzett & Deborah K. Kearney, Commentary to 1998
Amendment, 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. (West Supp. 2006)).
41
See Fla. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e); Florida voters must approve a proposed Constitutional
amendment by a vote of at least 60% approval; see also Brief for Petitioners’ at 19, Citizens
for Strong Schs. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 232 So. 3d 127, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)
(No. SC18-67), 2018 WL 2740355 (“The ballot statement presented to the voters who
approved the revision explained: Our Constitution presently requires ‘adequate provision’
for public schools. The Florida courts have held, however, that the Constitution does not
provide any standards for determining whether adequate provision has been made. To
address these shortcomings, the Commission recommended that our Constitution state the
education of Florida’s children is a fundamental value and is a paramount duty of the state.
Also, guidelines for determining whether the education system is adequate are provided,
and require that our system be efficient, safe, secure and high quality.”).
42
Fla. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a), (1998).
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on the state legislature.”43 The four categories of duty imposed on the state
legislature “range from those which ‘merely provide for a system of free
public schools’ Category I, to those which make education an important
or paramount duty of the state, Category IV.”44 Subsequent to the adoption
of the amendment, Florida’s Constitution contained one of the strongest
and most detailed explanations of a state’s duty to its students in the
nation.45
The 2006 Florida Supreme Court case Bush v. Holmes was the first
lawsuit where the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the amendment.46
The case involved a challenge to a specific voucher program known as the
Opportunity Scholarship Program (“OSP”), which gave students the
option, among others, to “receive funds from the public treasury, which
would otherwise have gone to the student’s school district, to pay the
student’s tuition at a private school.”47 The Supreme Court held in Holmes
that OSP vouchers violated Amendment IX, § 1(a) because it “funds
private schools that are not ‘uniform’ when compared with each other or
the public system.”48 Holmes also, importantly, stated that the 1998
amendments were made “in response in part to Coalition . . . to make clear
that education is a ‘fundamental value’ and ‘a paramount duty of the state,’
and to provide standards by which to measure the adequacy of the publicschool education provided by the state.”49
43

Staros, supra note 12, at 498.
Id. at 498-99; see William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State
Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV.
1639, 1647-49 (1989).
45
See R. Craig Wood & William E. Thro, Puffery or Law: Reflections on the Florida
School Finance Decision, 368 ED. LAW REP. 961, 965-66 (“Although the People of Florida
amended their State Constitution to add language which seemingly imposed the highest
possible duty on the State Legislature, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that these
words were “puffery” rather than law.); see also Staros, supra note 12, at 501 (While
describing the education mandate in the 1868 Florida Constitution—which the 1998
Constitution was partially modeled after—the author notes that a Constitutional
amendment that states that education is the “paramount duty of the state” is classified as a
Category IV clause, imposing a great duty to the legislature); see also Holmes, 919 So. 2d
at 404: “Using this rating system, Florida’s education clause in 1868 imposed a Category
IV duty on the legislature—a maximum duty on the State to provide for education.”
(quoting Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,
405 (Fla. 1996) n.10.) “After the 1998 revision restoring the ‘paramount duty’ language,
Florida’s education article is again classified as a Category IV clause, imposing a
maximum duty on the state to provide for public education that is uniform and of high
quality.”
46
Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 392.
47
Id. at 397.
48
Id. at 398.
49
Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. Of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127, 140 (Fla.
1st DCA 2019) (quoting Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 403).
44
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The Court in Holmes also “later described article IX, section 1(a) as
‘providing a comprehensive statement of the state’s responsibility
regarding the education of its children.”50 The importance of Bush v.
Holmes in analyzing Citizens for Strong Schools cannot be understated,
for it is a key example of the Florida Supreme Court analyzing the
language of the education mandate and ruling on the constitutionality of
such language. In that instance, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that that
language was, indeed, justiciable—a ruling that makes the outcome in
Citizens for Strong Schools, in which the Court ruled the case presented a
nonjusticiable political question, a break in the Court’s precedent.

III.

BACKSTORY AND EXPLANATION OF CITIZENS FOR
STRONG SCHOOLS

i.

Procedural History prior to Florida Supreme Court ruling

The instant case has a lengthy procedural history. In 2009, the
collective Petitioners—including public school students, parents, and
citizen organizations—filed suit against the collective Respondents—
including the State Board of Education, the President of the Florida Senate,
the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, and the Florida
Commissioner of Education—seeking a declaration that the State was
breaching its paramount duty under the Florida Constitution’s amended
version of Article IX, § 1(a).51 Focusing on the 2009 Appropriations Act’s
alleged inadequacies in equitable funding52, Petitioners “asserted that
‘adequate provision’ and ‘high quality’ are to be ‘measured by both the
enumerated characteristics of and inputs into the system itself as well as
the outcome results of that system.’”53 Petitioners criticized lack of
accountability, misuse of standardized test results, inadequate graduation
rates, and achievement tests, stating that the “failure to provide a highquality education disproportionately impacts minority, low income and

50

Id. (quoting Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 408).
Id. at 130.
52
Id.; see Florida Education Funding Appropriations Act of 2009, FLA. STAT. § 2009-3
(2009); see also Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Supplemental Relief at 11 ¶ 4142, Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Florida State Bd. of Educ., (No. 09-CA-4534), 2010
WL 8752271 (2010) (“The State has failed to make adequate provision for education,
which has resulted in an educational system that is not high quality. The 2009-10 and 201011 Appropriations Acts for K-12 education violated the Education Clause of the Florida
Constitution.”).
53
Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. Of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127, 130 (Fla.
1st DCA 2019).
51
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students with disabilities.”54 Petitioners thus requested that the trial court
order Respondents to establish a remedial plan that included “necessary
studies to determine what resources and standards are necessary to provide
a high-quality education to Florida students.”55
Respondents moved to dismiss Petitioners’ complaint, calling the
claim a “non-justiciable political question” in the same vein as the blanket
claims of unconstitutionality in the earlier Coalition litigation.56 The trial
court denied the motion because in the time since Coalition, the interpreted
amendment had been amended once again and thus Coalition was
outdated, non-binding case law.57 The trial court then pointed to Holmes,
which described how the 1998 amendments had been drafted “to provide
standards by which to measure the adequacy of the public-school
education provided by the state.”58 The trial court thus permitted
Petitioners to proceed on their claim seeking declaratory and supplemental
relief.59
As a result, Respondents then petitioned the First District to grant a
writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because
the allegations were instead raising non-justiciable political questions.60
The First District denied the petition but noted that the non-justiciable
political question argument was preserved for full appeal.61 Judge Roberts
and six other judges dissented, arguing that the terms “efficient and high
quality” were standards too vague to be enforceable by the court.62
However, the First District certified the following to the Florida Supreme
Court as being a question of great public importance:
“Does Article IX, Section 1(a) [of the] Florida
Constitution, set forth judicially ascertainable standards
that can be used to determine the adequacy, efficiency,
safety, security, and high quality of public education on a
statewide bases, so as to permit a court to decide claims

54

Id.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 131; see Haridopolos v. Citizens for Strong Sch., Inc., 81 So. 3d 465, 471 (Fla.
1st DCA 2012).
62
“Whether the [Constitution Revision] Commission intended to create a justiciable
standard is ultimately irrelevant. The test is whether an enforceable standard was actually
created by the text of the amendment itself. Because the terms ‘efficient . . . and high
quality’ are no more susceptible to judicial enforcement than the term ‘adequate,’ this claim
cannot be enforced by the courts.” Id.
55
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for declaratory judgment (and supplemental relief)
alleging noncompliance with Article IX, Section 1(a) of
the Florida Constitution?”63
The Florida Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction to
consider the certified question.64
In May 2014, Petitioners filed a Second Amended Complaint,
focusing the State’s alleged “failure to provide an adequate ‘overall level
of funding’ and to ‘conduct a cost analysis in order to determine the
amount of funding required to institute a high-quality education
system.’”65 Petitioners also argued that the state had failed to prove “a
‘uniform’ system of free public schools,” alleging that the two choice
programs – the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program (FTC) and the
McKay Scholarship for Students with Disabilities Program (McKay) –
were “systematically diverting public funds to private schools.”66
However, the trial court eventually ruled that “the Second Amended
Complaint did not contain any claim that either program violated the
Florida Constitution.”67
In 2016, a bench trial consisting of more than 5,000 documents68
entered a Final Judgment against Petitioners “on all claims,” including a
63

Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. Of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127, 131 (Fla.
1st DCA 2019); see Haridopolos, 81 So. 3d 465, 473 (“This cause having heretofore been
submitted to the Court on jurisdictional briefs and portions of the record deemed necessary
to reflect jurisdiction . . . and the Court having determined that it should decline to exercise
jurisdiction as to the Certified Great Public Importance and that it should decline to accept
jurisdiction as to the Express and Direct Conflict of Decisions, it is ordered that the Petition
for Review is Denied.”).
64
Citizens for Strong Schs., 262 So. 3d at 131; see Haridopolos v. Citizens for Strong
Schs., Inc., 103 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 2012).
65
Citizens for Strong Schs., 262 So. 3d at 131.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 132.
68
These documents were intending to establish and show “the structure of Florida’s
education system; the various policies and programs implemented by the State to achieve
its educational goals; the funding allocated for these programs; and student performance—
overall and by various demographics—under state and national assessments and other
measures. Ultimately, however, the trial court found all of the issues raised by Appellants
regarding educational adequacy, efficiency, and quality were properly considered ‘political
questions best resolved in the political arena,’ as the organic law did not provide judicially
manageable standards by which to measure the State’s actions in enacting and
implementing educational policies, as the dissenting judges on this court concluded in
2011.” Citizens for Strong Schs. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 232 So. 3d 1163, 1167 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2017); See Petitioners’ Initial Brief at 14, Citizens for Strong Schs. v. Fla. State Bd.
of Educ., 232 So. 3d 1163 (Fla.) (No. SC18-67), 2018 WL 2740355 (“Parents presented
evidence to the trial court that not all children are learning the core content knowledge, as
measured by wide disparities in achievement on state assessments, especially for children
experience poverty or attending school in poorer school districts.”)
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175-page appendix of findings of fact.69 The trial court described the
Petitioners’ claims as a nonjusticiable blanket challenge to the entire
system of public education in Florida and that the “new adjectives—
efficient and high quality—do not give judicially manageable content to
the adequacy standard that was held non-justiciable in the Coalition
case.”70 The trial court further reasoned that the variability in statewide
performance happened between counties of equivalent funding because
each county has its own authority over the allocation of resources.71 Lastly,
the court held that the claims violated “Florida’s strict separation-ofpowers doctrine.”72 Regarding evidence, the trial court pointed out that
“K-12 education has been the single largest component of the state general
revenue budget” over the course of the last twenty years and that the
Florida Education Finance Program “is generally recognized as one of the
most equalizing school funding formulas in the nation.”73 Furthermore, the
trial court reasoned that the Petitioners “failed to establish any causal
relationship between any alleged low student performance and a lack of
resources.”74
Following the bench trial, Petitioners filed an Initial Appellate Brief
in the First District Court of Appeal. In the Initial Brief, Petitioners again
presented extensive data in support of their request that the appellate court
hold their claim as a justiciable violation of the Florida Constitution.75
Petitioners first pointed to the standards of measuring a “high quality”
education, one of the standards from the constitutional amendment. To
illustrate the standards of a “high quality” education, Petitioners presented
state assessments aligned with the state’s curriculum and standards.76 The
scores from these assessments “are used for graduation, grade promotion,
teacher evaluations, and A-F letter grades to schools and districts” which
emphasized the “importance to the State of using the assessment system
to measure whether a high-quality education has been delivered.”77
Petitioners used these scores and assessments to present “undisputed
evidence for a trial court to measure whether a uniform and high-quality
education is being delivered to all students,”78 which showed that in 2014,
69

Citizens for Strong Schs v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127, 132 (Fla. 1st DCA
2019).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 133.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 134.
75
Petitioner’s Initial Brief, Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 232
So. 3d 1163 (Fla. 2017) (No. 1D16-2862), 2018 WL 2740355.
76
Id. at 4.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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only 58% of students received a passing score of 3 or higher in reading
and only 56% of students statewide received a passing score of 3 or higher
in math.79 The reading passing rates among subgroups show even greater
disparities: only 38% of black students, 54% of Hispanic students, 19% of
English Language Learners, 47% of students receiving Free-Reduced
Lunch (a proxy for poverty), and 37% of homeless students passed the
statewide assessment with a 3 or higher.80
Petitioners also pointed to the wide disparities among school districts:
the statewide average passing rate for third graders was 56% based on the
2014 statewide assessment results, but in St. Johns County, 76% of third
graders passed reading, and in Hamilton County, only 35% of third grades
passed reading with a 3 or higher;81 the passing rate for the eighth-grade
math assessment in Bradford County was 5%, with a 6% passing rate for
Free and Reduced Lunch students and a 0% passing rate for both black
students and students with disabilities.82 Graduation rates in 2015 were
equally varying, with four school districts below 60%, including Franklin
County, who had a graduation rate of 49%, whereas St. Johns County had
a graduation rate of over 90%, and Dixie County had a graduation rate of
96.9%.83 Petitioners also point to state funding inefficiencies, including
how the funding formula used does not ensure “that education financial
resources are aligned with student performance expectations as required
by statute,” nor has the State “determined what resources are necessary to
ensure that all students achieve on the standards, or how much it costs to
deliver a high-quality education.”84
Despite all the evidence pointing to the lack of uniformity within the
Florida public school system, the First District affirmed on all counts.85
Specifically, the First DCA held that Petitioners’ arguments raised
political questions not subject to judicial review because of the lack of
judicially discoverable standards available in the constitutional
amendment.86 The First DCA further held that Petitioners’ requested
damages would require the court to violate the separation of powers

79

Id.
Id. at 5.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 6.
84
Id. at 9.
85
Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 232 So. 3d 1163, 1165-66
(Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
86
Id.
80
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doctrine.87 In support of the decision,88 the Court pointed to the reasoning
from Marrero ex rel. Tabalas v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,89 a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case from 1999: “Looking to a similar case
in another state, we agree with the conclusion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court that it would be contrary to the very essence of our
constitution’s educational aspirations for the courts to ‘bind future
Legislatures . . . to a present judicial view’ of adequacy, efficiency, and
quality.”90 The appellate court then distinguished other state Supreme
Court decisions that came to a different conclusion91, stating that the court
respectfully disagrees with those “decisions as insufficiently deferential to
the fundamental principle of separation of powers imposed on Florida’s
judiciary and the practical reality that educational policies and goals must
evolve to meet ever changing public conditions, which is precisely why
only the legislative and executive branches are assigned such power.”92

ii.

Florida Supreme Court ruling

In a plurality opinion written and filed per curiam, a sharply divided
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the First DCA’s opinion, ruling again in
favor of the Respondent, Florida State Board of Education.93 Regarding
whether the Court has been presented with a manageable standard for
assessing “whether the State has made ‘adequate provision’ for an
‘efficient’ and ‘high quality’ system of education ‘that allows students to
obtain a high quality education,’” the Supreme Court held that it had not,
“There is no language or authority in Article IX, section 1(a) that would empower
judges to order the enactment of educational policies regarding teaching methods and
accountability, the appropriate funding of public schools, the proper allowance of charter
schools and school choice, the best methods of student accountability and school
accountability, and related funding priorities.” Id. at 1166.
88
Id. at 1172.
89
739 A.2d 110, 112 (1999).
90
Id.
91
See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Just. in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 242
(2010) (concluding the state did not provide “suitable” educational
opportunities); Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257 (Mont.
2005) (holding that funding for education was inadequate and that determination of
“quality” education was justiciable, but deferring to state legislature to provide threshold
definition of “quality”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1989) (concluding that the legislative branch failed to comply with the constitutional
requirement of providing an “efficient system of common schools”).
92
Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 232 So. 3d 1163, 1172 (Fla.
1st DCA 2017).
93
Id. at 135. The plurality consisted of Chief Justice Canady, Justice Alan Lawson,
Associate Justice Edward C. LaRose, and Justice Jorge Labarga, who concurred in the
result only; Chief Justice Canady wrote a concurrence which was joined by Justice Lawson
and Justice LaRose. Justice Ricky Polston recused himself from the decision.
87
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and reasoned that “this case turns in part on Petitioners’ failure to present
the courts with any roadmap by which to avoid intruding into the powers
of the other branches of government.”94 The Court reasoned that the
appropriations at issue had changed throughout the many years of this case
making its way through the court system, and that “[i]n effect, Petitioners
ask this Court to declare the current educational system unconstitutional
based on years-old evidence.”95 Chief Justice Canady wrote a concurrence
arguing that the judiciary lacks the constitutional authority “to make the
monumental funding and policy decisions that the Petitioners and the
dissenters seek to shift to the judicial branch.”96 Chief Justice Canady also
stated that “[t]his result is required by the fundamental structure of our
constitutional system and by the very nature of judicial power.”97
Justice Barbara Pariente wrote a dissent which both Justice Fred Lewis
and Justice Peggy Quince joined.98 Justice Pariente stated that the
plurality’s opinion “eviscerates article IX, section 1, of the Florida
Constitution, contrary to the clear intent of the voters, and abdicates its
responsibility to interpret this critical provision and construe the terms
‘uniform,’ ‘efficient,’ and ‘high quality,’ enshrined in that provision.”99
She further opined that the amendment in question “was intended to
remedy the Court’s 1996 opinion in Coalition, which held that article IX,
section 1 did not provide judicially manageable standards for the courts to
adjudicate claims brought under the provision,”100 alluding to the fact that
once again, despite the amendment, the Court has ruled against petitioners
on the very same grounds, which she said had “reduced to empty words a
constitutional promise to provide an adequate educational system for our
children.”101 Justice Pariente also stated that Petitioners’ claims are not to
seek that the K-12 public education system is blanketly unconstitutional,
but to show “the State has violated its constitutional obligation under
article IX, section 1 in specific ways.”102
Furthermore, Justice Pariente found the claims justiciable, reasoning
that the Florida Supreme Court is responsible for adjudicating
Constitutional claims even when it requires the Court to define terms and
new standards set forth by the legislature: “[w]hile deference to the
Legislature and separation of powers are clearly important constitutional
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147.
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principles, this Court cannot use those principles to escape its obligation
to interpret provisions of the Florida Constitution and enforce the rights it
grants to the citizens of this state.”103 Justice Pariente disagreed with the
First District’s reliance on Marrero v. Commonwealth because just three
months before the First DCA’s ruling on the instant case’s appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had declined to use the precedent of
Marrero; instead, it had held that the Petitioner in William Penn School
District v. Pennsylvania Department of Education challenged the
education system based on the state constitution was justiciable.104 Justice
Pariente also pointed out that the reliance of Marrero had been “outdated
and overruled precedent, to the exclusion of the majority of other state
supreme courts.”105
In contrast to Marrero, Justice Pariente referenced that other state
supreme courts have found the terms “uniform” and “efficient” to be
justiciable in the context of a constitutional Education Clause.106 Justice
Pariente also argued that ordinary dictionary definitions should have been
used to develop judicially enforceable standards for the term “high
quality”107; she also stated that “the Florida Legislature has already defined
‘high quality’ by providing substantive content standards for students. As
an example, the State prioritizes students’ preparation for postsecondary
education without remediation.”108 Justice Pariente concluded that based
on the evidence presented, “Petitioners have made a strong showing that
the State has failed to provide a ‘high quality’ and ‘efficient’ education to
all of Florida’s students,”109 and also concluded that Petitioners’ claim is
justiciable and should have had the opportunity to establish that the State
is violating its constitutional obligation.110
Justice Fred Lewis also wrote and filed a dissent, in which Justices
Pariente and Quince joined.111 Justice Lewis stated that he believed the
plurality made a “very grave and harmful mistake” in this ruling, stating:
“Although I understand their good-faith and well-intentioned approach,
only time will truly reveal the depth of the injury inflicted upon Florida’s
103

Id. at 148.
Id. at 148-149.
105
Id. at 149. To see how other state supreme courts have construed the judicially
manageable terms set forth in article IX, section 1, see e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211;
Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1259 (Wyo. 1995); Davis v. State, 804
N.W.2d 618 (S.D. 2011)
106
Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 232 So. 3d 127, 152-153
(Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
107
Id. at 154.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 155.
110
Id. at 157.
111
Id.
104
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children. The words describing the right to a high quality education and
the constitutional concept of protecting that right ring hollow without a
remedy to protect that right.”112 Justice Lewis then cited Marbury v.
Madison and the Federalist papers to prove his point that Article IX,
section 1(a) “clearly presents many justiciable questions that Florida
courts can and should decide.”113 Justice Lewis further expands on that
point by saying, “If we, as common law judges, do not discharge our duty
to interpret the Constitution—even in complex and at times largely
passionate cases—then constitutional protections would never have
life.”114
Justice Lewis then describes why he considers the constitutional
amendment justiciable:
Preliminarily, “courts must, in the first instance, interpret
the text in question and determine whether and to what
extent the issue is textually committed.”115 Both the First
District Court of Appeal below and the Respondents
argue that the inclusion of the phrase “by law” in article
IX, section 1(a) somehow places the entire field of
education as within the exclusive, unreviewable province
of the legislative and executive branches. That logic is
flawed. “By law” is a common phrase in our
Constitution—used on 155 occasions—simply to signify
that some legislation in the area is either permissible or
necessary.116
As a result, Justice Lewis argues that “nothing in the language of
article IX, section 1(a) so much as hints at the notion that the definition of
a right to education is exclusively a legislative and executive
prerogative.”117 Justice Lewis then points to the terms “safe and secure” as
two justiciable terms within the constitutional amendment.118 The only
terms that have yet to be interpreted by the Court, he states, are “efficient”
112

Id.
Id.
114
Id. at 158.
115
Id. (quoting Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).
116
Id. at 158 (citing Ison v. Zimmerman, 372 So. 2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1979); Fla. Carry,
Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 212 So. 3d 452, 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
117
Id.
118
“Two of the other requirements, safe and secure, are certainly subject to judicial
review—as the trial court concluded in the final order. Final Order at 19 (“The terms in
Article IX relating to “safe” and “secure” are subject to judicially manageable
standards . . . .Florida’s trial courts deal with issues related to safety and security all day
long.”). Id.
113
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and “high quality,” and Justice Lewis makes his views clear that
interpreting and defining those terms part of the are imperative, vital role
of the judiciary, and that by concluding the terms non-justiciable, the Court
has inflicted great harm in its ruling.119

IV.

ANALYSIS

i.
THE PLURALITY IN CITIZENS FOR STRONGER
SCHOOLS ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED PETITIONERS’
ALLEGATION AS A NONJUSTICIABLE POLITICAL QUESTION
The failure of Coalition to elicit a Florida Supreme Court ruling that
declares the State in violation of a justiciable fundamental right has had
lasting effects on the State. Following the CRC’s adoption of Proposal 157
and the subsequent Constitutional amendment, the Florida Supreme Court
found in Holmes that the new amendment provided a judicially
manageable standard. Despite this, the Florida Supreme Court ruled just
the opposite in Citizens for Stronger Schools. This ruling goes against the
legislative intent of the CRC, the will of the people, and the ample statistics
and evidence on the record. Furthermore, because of this ruling, Florida
has regrettably isolated itself as a state that has refused to address
fundamental educational inequities120 and will continue to fall behind in
the national rankings of state education systems.
“The process of interpreting and defining those terms may be somewhat challenging,
but non justiciability is simply not the appropriate solution. Judges occasionally throw up
justiciability barricades only to avoid the difficult or complex cases, taking the easy way
out by using excuses to defer the decision of a case to a legislative body. But if our standard
is to avoid difficult questions simply because they may implicate some attenuated political
concern, then the Legislature has carte blanche to do as it pleases without any constitutional
oversight or protection. The Legislature is composed of politicians; so, by definition,
everything that the Legislature does is political in the abstract.” Id.
120
Indeed, as an Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Appellant/Petitioners for Citizens for
Strong Schools points out, “State supreme courts around the U.S. have held states to
standards set forth in their constitutions and intervened when education systems failed to
adhere to them, finding such claims to be undoubtedly justiciable.” See Amicus Curiae
Brief in Support of Appellants/Petitioners, at 14, Citizens for Strong Schs. v. Fla. State Bd.
of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127 (2019) (No. SC18-67). It further points out that Washington,
North Carolina, New Hampshire, Kentucky, and South Carolina have help educational
systems accountable for disparities in performance among sub-groups of children. Id. at
14-18. This Amicus Curiae also points out that state supreme courts have held the funding
schemes of states with similar constitutional language as insufficient and unconstitutional
for failing to account for the unique needs of “all children,” pointing to similar suits in
Tennessee, Kansas, New York, and New Jersey. Id. at 18-20. This Amici Curiae was
written by four organizations and one professor of law: (1) National Law Center on
Homelessness & Poverty; (2) Florida’s Children First; (3) the Children and Youth Law
119
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The wide gaps in numerous measures of success of certain groups of
students—including test scores of students of African American or
Hispanic descent, impoverished students or students who attend school in
a poorer district, and homeless students—show the significant ways in
which the education system in Florida disproportionately fails to serve the
needs of minorities, the poor, and students with physical, emotional,
developmental, learning, and intellectual disabilities. These alarming gaps
in success rates, based on evidence Petitioners provided, do not reveal a
“uniform” or “high quality” system of education as mandated by the
Constitutional amendment, and thus it is clear that the state’s “paramount
duty . . . to make adequate provision for the education of all children
residing within its borders”121 has been breached. However, the plurality
argued that the constitutional amendment does not provide justiciable
standards because Petitioners “fail to present any manageable standard by
which to avoid judicial intrusion into the powers of the other branches of
government.”122 The plurality’s argument that this case involves a
nonjusticiable political question fails for a variety of reasons.
First, it is erroneous and misleading to say that Petitioners did not
present “sufficiently manageable standards” for the Court to interpret;123
given that the Court had already found the amendment to provide
justiciable standards in Bush v. Holmes.124 In that case, the Court said that
“[a]fter the 1998 revision restoring the ‘paramount duty’ language,
Florida’s education article is again classified as a Category IV clause,
imposing a maximum duty on the state to provide for public education that
is uniform and of high quality.”125 If the Legislature can be found to have
violated that maximum duty in Holmes, it can be found in violation in
Citizens for Strong Schools as well. Furthermore, the adequate provision
as set forth by the legislature can be found to be in violation of the state’s
constitutional duty based again on Holmes’ precedent; in that case, the
Court wrote “Article IX, section 1(a) is a limitation on the Legislature’s
power because it provides a mandate to provide for children’s education
and a restriction on the execution of that mandate.”126 Based on that
precedent, the Court should have never refused to rule in favor of
Petitioners in order to “avoid judicial intrusion into the powers of the other
Clinic at the University of Miami School of Law; and (4) FSU College of Law, Children’s
Advocacy Clinic and Michael J. Dale, professor of law at Nova Southeastern University.
121
Fla. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (1998).
122
Citizens for Strong Schs. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 262 So. 3d 262, 129-130 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2019).
123
Id. at 129.
124
919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
125
Id. at 404.
126
Id. at 407.
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branches of government” because the Court itself ruled that same
Constitutional language as a necessary requirement of the judiciary, not a
separation of powers violation.127
Moreover, a major indication that the Court should have intervened is
the legislative history that led to this court case in the first place; namely,
that after Coalition failed to garner a Court ruling in favor of fixing the
gaps in equitable education in Florida public schools, the Florida
Constitution was amended to rectify the inability of the court to intervene
in said constitutional violations. The legislative history from the
Constitution Revision Committee clearly shows deliberations between
committee members on the increased duty on the State, and thus the
judicial actions that could be commenced against the State, that would be
created by the inclusion of the 1998 amendment. Another indication of the
justiciability of this amendment is the fact that the Florida voters voted for
the amendment’s inclusion in the Florida Constitution. This was not some
random bit of legislation that the vast majority of Floridians would never
hear about; this amendment, which was on the 1998 Florida ballot,
received 71% “yes” votes and 29% “no” votes, meaning this amendment
was approved by an overwhelming majority of voters.
Floridians included this amendment in their Constitution because they
wanted to improve the public education system in their state; when the
system of education thus violates the language of the Constitution, it is the
right of the people with standing, injured by that Constitutional violation,
to sue and receive justice or systemic change. The Courts are supposed to
imbue meaning into the words of the Constitution; this has been legal
precedent in the United States since Marbury v. Madison established that
the U.S. Constitution is law and not just aspirational language, and thus
subject to judicial review.128 Judicial review grants the judiciary the ability
to strike down laws, statutes, and other governmental actions that violate
the Constitution. Without justiciable recourse on state violations of
constitutional amendments, whether those violations are purposeful or the
act of poor legislation or policy, the Floridian children at the heart of this
lawsuit have no realistic way of pursuing justice or real system change.129
The argument that the Constitutional language is merely aspirational
and not justiciable is similarly untrue and not rooted in the aftermath of

127

Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc., 262 So. 3d at 130.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1927); see generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
129
“The protections our citizens have demanded are merely hollow phrases of
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Coalition and the legislative history of the amendment itself.130 An
“aspirational” constitutional statement, especially one that creates the
maximum duty on the state and one that is voted by an overwhelming
majority of voting constituents, does exactly what it describes; it creates
binding constitutional language on specific subjects or on the state itself
that the citizens aspire the state to respect as a liberty. That is to say, every
constitutional amendment is arguably aspirational because every
constitutional amendment aspires to show the intent of the state to respect
some liberty of the people who live under that constitution. If the state and
its people are bound to obey the Constitution as law, then the lack of
obeying the Constitution is a violation of law, and thus there must be a
judicial remedy for such a violation of law, even if those violations have
been compounded by an entire system of government.
The plurality was dead set on viewing a constitutional law question
not with the overwhelming precedent of the justiciability of the language,
but with the strict devotion to the rigid, unworkable standards of strict
separation of power. That rigid unwillingness to view the question as
justiciable blinded these justices of their requirement as the judiciary to
imbue meaning into the constitutional text, a tradition as old as Marbury
v. Madison; as Justice Pariente writes in her dissent, “[t]he plurality has
abdicated its responsibility to interpret the constitution and eviscerated
article IX, section 1 contrary to the clear intent of the voters.”131 The
plurality’s rigidity in strict separation of powers also allowed the plurality
to skirt their obligation to view overwhelming evidence and data of
inadequacy and lack of uniformity and deduce that inadequate funding
allocation is the root of this problem. This does not require the Supreme
Court to decide what funding needs to be increased or reallocated, because
the plurality is correct in that funding is a function of the legislative
branch;132 it only required the Court to look at the data and make a
mathematical judgment as to whether the data provided was uniform for
all Florida public school children, or at least substantially uniform. If the
plurality was forced to admit the lack of uniformity among these affected
subgroups, then it stands to reason that the Constitutional amendment is
violated because there is an obvious lack of uniform scores. This lack of
uniformity is logically a lack of the Constitutionally required “adequate
provision.” What is the nexus between the mathematical question of
130
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uniformity posed and the State of Florida’s liability? It’s simply put forth
by Petitioners: the current system of public education funding provision is
not adequate because it does not provide for a uniform system of education
for all students as set forth by the Florida Constitution, particularly
affecting those students who perhaps need a strong education the most. It
is shameful that this Court ruled in this way despite the overwhelming
evidence supporting Petitioners’ claims as well as the overwhelming
evidence that this amendment is justiciable.
What is more disconcerting is the way the Florida Supreme Court’s
plurality opinion accepted the First District Court of Appeals’ ruling,
which cherry-picked bad law—overlooking the majority of persuasive law
from other states’ Supreme Courts—in order to rule that the claims were
not justiciable. Why would the First District Court of Appeal, for example,
rely on Marrero v. Commonwealth, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case
where that state’s highest court held that a claim was not justiciable, when
three months prior to the First District’s ruling, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court overruled Marrero and held that a similar claim was justiciable?133
Why would the First District, and the Florida Supreme Court, look at the
other States’ Supreme Courts and willfully ignore all of the persuasive
case law from other jurisdictions to the contrary?134 As Justice Lewis
writes in his dissent, “justiciability is an excuse here to avoid a tough case
in these education adequacy challenges, rather than sound legal reasoning
based on a valid separation of powers analysis. And, when the risk is that
a nonjusticiability label could render nugatory our children’s
constitutional right to education, dodging our duty won’t suffice.”135

ii.
THE LACK OF UNIFORMITY AND ADEQUATE
PROVISIONS WILL HAVE DEVASTATING EFFECTS ON
FLORIDA’S CHILDREN—ESPECIALLY ITS MOST
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
Florida’s public-school system was wrongfully found by the plurality
to be an adequate system of public education. Notwithstanding the
evidence provided by Petitioners, as well as national data and studies
corroborating the significance of the evidence as proof of the inadequacy
of the system, it is clear that the refusal of the plurality to intervene will
have lasting damaging effects on Florida’s place in the national education
ranking system, but more importantly on the subgroups children who have
been injured by these inequities.

133
134
135

Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc., 262 So. 3d at 149 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
Id. at nn. 15-16; see also cases cited supra note 5.
Id. at 161 (Lewis, J., dissenting).

2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

49

A comparison of this state’s education system with other states’ begins
with a comparison of legislative appropriations. One of the major
indicators of the strength of the appropriations lies in the per pupil average
per state. According to the 2017 U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of
School System Finances, depicting revenues and spending for all public
elementary-secondary school systems in 2017, Florida spent $9,075 per
pupil, one of the lowest per pupil expenditures in the nation, where the
lowest expenditure per pupil was just $7,179.136 For perspective, New
York, the state with the highest per pupil spending, spent $23,091 per
pupil. In the 2017-2018 school year, Florida had 2,832,424 students
enrolled in public elementary and secondary schools; New York had
2,724,663.137
The wide gaps in data provided by Petitioners is a devastating insight
into how the current Florida education system has perpetuated a form of
de facto segregation, not necessarily in the form of traditional, racial-based
segregation of pre-Brown v. Board of Education138 days, but that of
socioeconomic segregation. This socioeconomic segregation is just as
sinister as its racially based counterpart, for it is the kind that has lasting
effects on a person’s chances of social mobility. If a school system’s low
national rankings and statistics, fueled by its inadequate funding
appropriations, have created such vast inequity amongst its student
population, something has gone seriously wrong. These wide gaps in
success rates for certain subgroups of students are not just blatantly in
violation of the Florida Constitution via Amendment IX § 1(a); they are
literal indicators of the future success or failure of the state and country at
large.
According to the Education Trust, Florida ranks thirty-second out of
fifty comparing state contribution to state funding, within the bottom
fiftieth percentile,139 despite Florida having the third largest population in
the United States140 and despite having the fourth and sixth largest school
districts in the country (Miami-Dade and Broward counties,
respectively).141 Additionally, studies have shown it is an increasingly
difficult task to spread funding between traditional schools and charter
136
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schools in Florida.142 Charter schools generally do not serve the same
diverse populations that traditional schools may, and that can have a
negative effect on the traditional schools. “[T]he implication remains
funding plays a statistically significant role in student achievement in
traditional schools, which was not present in many of the charter
schools . . . the traditional schools were serving far more students in
poverty, with special needs, and English language learner needs than the
charter schools so it stands to reason funding would play a bigger role in
the achievement of these groups.”143 Impoverished students bear the brunt
of such a conservative system of funding. “Inequality in mathematics and
reading skills results in inequality in educational attainment and inequality
in labor market earnings. The best evidence on the reading and math skills
of American children comes from the National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP), often called the nation’s report card. Math skills are
particularly important predictors of subsequent labor market outcomes.”144
If the argument were based solely on the notion that these statistics
violated the Constitutional mandate for “uniform[ity],” but this is not just
a problem that should be left to these individual school districts. This is
not just an argument that appeals to just to those interested in education as
a harbinger for social equality; increasing graduation rates and
encouraging better schools can have a long-term positive economic impact
on a state. For example, improved education and more stable employment
greatly increase tax revenue, such as a return of at least 7 dollars for every
dollar invested in pre-kindergarten education.145 Additionally, ensuring
that K-12 public education is strong enough to carry over into a four-year
college degree has important benefits for society, according to a 2008
study on the relationship between increased public spending on higher
education and long-term quality of life: “higher income, lower
unemployment, better health, longer life, faster technology creation and
adoption, reduced crime, greater tolerance, increased civic involvement,
and so on.”146 For instance, poor children who attend better-funded schools
are more likely to complete high school and have higher earnings and
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lower poverty rates in adulthood.147 Also, graduating from high school
reduces dependency on public health programs by 60%.148 Furthermore,
there is a strong correlation between increasing education and decreasing
crime149, which would save the state of Florida incarceration costs. This is
especially true for students who finish their education and graduate from
a secondary school; hence, it should be the responsibility of the state to
ensure educational equity, and secondary educational attainment should
be of the upmost importance to the state150. The importance of educational
equity thus has many far-reaching long-term economic impacts on the
state of Florida, meaning this lack of adequacy and uniformity will have
severe effects not just on the individual students negatively affected by
this ruling, but also on the state of the economy as a whole.
Finally, the law is not black and white; while it is important to analyze
precedent and to respect the differing goals and responsibilities of the
executive and legislative branches, the judiciary must also think critically
about the implications of its ruling. By not ruling in favor of Petitioners,
the judiciary has made a series of unfortunate statements: it is a statement
to the legislature that its funding is enough, when it is quite obviously not;
it is a statement that these statistics are uniform, when they are
mathematically and by definition not; it is a statement to Petitioners who
have been injured by these policies and appropriations that they do not
have a legal remedy when the government violates its Constitution, when
they do; and it is a statement to the entire country that the Florida system
of public education is not a uniform, high quality system.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the decision upheld in the Florida Supreme Court will
have damaging effects on the current generation of students. The most
vulnerable students of the State of Florida will continue to languish with
disproportionate failure rates, and an important judicial remedy was just
denied to them, making it now nearly impossible for true change to come
to a system of public education that so desperately needs it. The quality of
an education system should not be dependent on inequitable distribution
of resources, and these affected subgroups require more funding, not less.
The plurality’s decision is, at best, conservative justices refusing to
perform their obligation to uphold the constitution based squarely at odds
with prevailing trend in case law from other state supreme courts as well
as with Florida’s own legislative history and case law on the matter; at
worst, though, it is a dangerous abuse of power—with the justices willfully
overlooking evidence of a failing school system in violation of the state’s
constitutional mandate for education—made under the pretext of strict
separation of powers, all at the expense of vulnerable children. As Justice
Pariente states in the conclusion of her dissent, the guarantee of a system
of free public education for Florida’s children is meaningless “without a
judicial branch willing to perform its constitutional duty.”151
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